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A B S T R A C T   
When performing joint actions, people rely on common ground – shared information that provides the required 
basis for mutual understanding. Common ground can be based on people’s interaction history or on knowledge 
and expectations people share, e.g., because they belong to the same culture or social class. Here, we suggest that 
people rely on yet another form of common ground, one that originates in their similarities in multisensory 
processing. Specifically, we focus on ‘crossmodal correspondences’ – nonarbitrary associations that people make 
between stimulus features in different sensory modalities, e.g., between stimuli in the auditory and the visual 
modality such as high-pitched sounds and small objects. Going beyond previous research that focused on inves-
tigating crossmodal correspondences in individuals, we propose that people can use these correspondences for 
communicating and coordinating with others. Initial support for our proposal comes from a communication 
game played in a public space (an art gallery) by pairs of visitors. We observed that pairs created nonverbal 
communication systems by spontaneously relying on ‘crossmodal common ground’. Based on these results, we 
conclude that crossmodal correspondences not only occur within individuals but that they can also be actively 
used in joint action to facilitate the coordination between individuals.   
1. Introduction 
Joint actions come in countless different forms and complexities. At 
first glance, a simple handshake does not have much in common with an 
expertly synchronized swimming performance nor with an improvised 
dinner party. However, what co-actors in all types of joint actions rely on 
is the fact that they share something: Individuals “cannot even begin to 
coordinate […] without assuming a vast amount of shared information 
or common ground” (Clark & Brennan, 1991, p. 222; cf. also Brennan & 
Hanna, 2009; Clark, 1996, p. 199; Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1960; Stal-
naker, 2002). Common ground is crucial to get a joint action started; at 
the same time, new common ground builds up between co-actors with 
every joint action they perform. 
1.1. Common ground 
According to Clark (1996, 2006), one can broadly distinguish two 
different types of common ground: Communal common ground is based 
on cultural communities such as nationality, ethnic group, occupation or 
gender, whereas personal common ground is based on people’s joint 
experience. For example, when going for a bike ride with a friend, we 
ride on the right side of the street because of a culturally shared norm; 
my friend takes the lead because our joint experience has taught us that 
she knows her way around the city better than I do. 
When performing a joint action, the extent of common ground be-
tween co-actors may be minimal (e.g., when two strangers share nothing 
but a joint goal; cf. Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010) or it 
may be extensive (e.g., think of two synchronized swimmers who have 
trained together for years and also share their private lives as a married 
couple). Co-actors may rely on common ground implicitly or they may 
decide to make (specific parts of) their common ground mutually 
manifest (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Importantly, what is (or is not) 
common ground between two people is to a certain extent subjective as 
“we are in fact acting on our individual beliefs or assumptions about 
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what is in our common ground” (Clark, 1996, p.96; also see Wilkes- 
Gibbs & Clark, 1992). Thus, individuals engaged in joint action will act 
upon what they think is common ground in the specific interaction and 
they will therefore expect that their behavior is comprehensible for their 
interaction partners. This is most obviously the case in conversations 
where speakers adjust to the expected shared background with their 
addressees, for example by simplifying word choices when interacting 
with children (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Clark & Krych, 2004; Horton, 
2007; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; 
Lockridge & Brennan, 2002). It is, however, possible that an individual’s 
belief about what is common ground in an interaction is actually false 
and that they will thus not be understood (or misunderstood) by their 
interaction partner – it is only when both partners’ beliefs about their 
common ground coincide that the interaction will be successful. Taken 
together, common ground supports social interaction in various forms 
and contexts and is, therefore, a decisive factor for the success of any 
joint action. 
1.2. Communication 
When common ground between co-actors is limited or completely 
absent, the interaction is prone to go awry. One way to quickly establish 
common ground, e.g., when agents do not share a visual context, is by 
using (verbal) communication in its function as a coordination device 
(Brennan, 2005; Clark & Kruch, 2004; Duff, Hengst, Tranel, & Cohen, 
2006; Scott-Phillips, 2015; Vesper et al., 2010). It is even possible that 
language has evolved precisely for the purpose of facilitating joint ac-
tion, as it allows, for example, to solve coordination problems efficiently 
over time and distances. At the same time, (verbal) communication is 
itself a joint action as it requires coordination of meaning between 
sender(s) and receiver(s) (Clark, 1996; Duff et al., 2006; Galantucci, 
2009; Shintel & Keysar, 2009). 
If, however, there is no shared language and hence no (linguistic) 
convention to rely on, how do co-actors achieve common ground and, 
thus, coordinate their actions? Studies in the field of ‘experimental se-
miotics’ have shown that when people need to coordinate their actions 
but cannot rely on conventional language or other forms of pre- 
established common ground, they might spontaneously invent a set of 
symbols and thereby bootstrap a novel communication system (e.g. de 
Ruiter, Noordzij, Newman-Norlund, Hagoort, & Toni, 2007; Galantucci, 
2005; Scott-Phillips, Kirby, & Ritchie, 2009). Relatedly, research on 
‘sensorimotor communication’ (Pezzulo et al., 2019; Pezzulo, Donnar-
umma, & Dindo, 2013; Vesper & Sevdalis, 2020) has demonstrated that 
when conventional communication is not feasible, people might sys-
tematically adjust particular movement parameters of their instru-
mental actions such that they violate an observer’s motor prediction 
(Becchio, Sartori, Bulgheroni, & Castiello, 2008; Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Knoblich & Jordan, 2003; Prinz, 1997; 
Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). 
In doing so, they send nonverbal, communicative signals which in turn 
facilitate interpersonal coordination (Candidi, Curioni, Donnarumma, 
Sacheli, & Pezzulo, 2015; Sacheli, Tidoni, Pavone, Aglioti, & Candidi, 
2013; Schmitz, Vesper, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2018a; Vesper & Richard-
son, 2014; Vesper, Schmitz, & Knoblich, 2017). Together, these findings 
suggest that communication naturally emerges out of the need to 
interact and coordinate actions with others (Clark, 1996; Galantucci, 
2005). 
In contrast to the research on experimental semiotics and sensori-
motor communication, which explores how communication systems 
emerge from scratch or piggyback on instrumental movements, we focus 
here on communication that builds on pre-existing common ground. Our 
proposal is twofold:  
(1) Firstly, we suggest that so-called “crossmodal correspondences” – 
a perceptual phenomenon that has been identified and exten-
sively explored by researchers in the field of multisensory 
perception (Spence, 2011; Spence & Deroy, 2013) – provide a 
form of pre-existing common ground between people.  
(2) Secondly, we suggest that people can actively employ this 
‘crossmodal common ground’ for communication. Communica-
tion, in turn, will allow for successful joint action. 
In the present study, two co-actors coordinate their actions towards a 
joint goal or outcome (Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011; Vesper 
et al., 2010). Critically, they need to communicate in order to achieve 
their joint goal. In turn, they achieve their joint goal through the act of 
communicating, i.e., by successfully coordinating meaning. Thus, co-
ordination and communication are tightly intertwined in the present 
context: Co-actors’ interaction is a joint action because of the presence of 
a joint goal and an act of communication because it involves an explicit 
communicative intent (cf. Scott-Phillips et al., 2009). 
In the following, we will provide a brief background on crossmodal 
correspondences and then spell out our hypotheses about how these 
correspondences can serve to support joint action. 
1.3. Crossmodal correspondences 
Crossmodal correspondences are stable associations that people 
make between stimulus features in different sensory modalities, most 
commonly between stimuli in the auditory and the visual modality. For 
example, people associate high-pitched sounds with small, light objects 
(Evans & Treisman, 2010; Gallace & Spence, 2006; Spence & Parise, 
2012) and low-pitched sounds with big, dark objects (Klapetek, Ngo, & 
Spence, 2012; Marks, 1987). Research has shown that crossmodal cor-
respondences are already experienced early in development (Dolscheid, 
Shayan, Majid, & Casasanto, 2013; Walker et al., 2010) and that people 
make such associations a) automatically (Spence & Deroy, 2013) and b) 
both implicitly and explicitly (cf. Spence, 2011). 
Four different kinds of crossmodal correspondences have been 
distinguished, namely those based on statistical regularities found in 
nature (e.g., between the size of an object and its resonance frequency; 
Bee, Perrill, & Owen, 2000; Coward & Stevens, 2004), those based on 
structural associations (e.g., between magnitude-related stimuli features 
such as size and loudness; Smith & Sera, 1992; Walsh, 2003), those that 
are semantically mediated (e.g., between auditory pitch and visual 
elevation; Martino & Marks, 1999; also see Walker, Francis, & Walker, 
2010), and those that are hedonically mediated (e.g., between the taste 
and shape of food; Parise, Spence, & Deroy, 2016; Velasco, Woods, 
Deroy, & Spence, 2015). Research has shown that these four kinds of 
correspondences differ in terms of their qualitative experience and 
developmental trajectory, as well as in how they affect human infor-
mation processing (cf. Spence, 2011). 
As regards the function of crossmodal correspondences, it has been 
suggested that they facilitate the crossmodal binding problem, i.e., they 
help us to decide whether incoming unisensory signals originate from 
the same or different sources – and thus whether they should be bound 
together, or integrated, in the brain (Ernst, 2007; Spence, 2011; Spence, 
Ngo, Lee, & Tan, 2010). In other words, when no other contextual cues 
are available, one may “by default” rely on crossmodal associations. For 
example, I may rely on the above-mentioned association between pitch 
and size to determine whether the low-pitched sounds I’m hearing are 
emitted by the small or the big frog I’m observing at the pond. 
1.4. Crossmodal common ground 
Based on our proposal that multisensory processing can offer a basis 
for communication and joint action, the aim of the present proof-of- 
concept study was to test the following concrete hypothesis: Cross-
modal correspondences provide a form of common ground (‘crossmodal 
common ground’) that can be actively used to facilitate joint action. 
More specifically, when joint action partners need to communicate to 
facilitate coordination yet cannot use conventional language, they will 
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rely on crossmodal correspondences. In doing so, they will implicitly act 
on the assumption that these associations are part of the sum of infor-
mation they in fact share with each other,1 i.e., they will assume these 
associations to be part of the common ground between them (Clark, 1996, 
2006). This assumption, in turn, will make them expect communication 
to be successful. 
To test our hypothesis, we created a communication game to be 
played jointly by two participants – a ‘sender’ and a ‘receiver’ – in a 
public space at an art gallery (see Fig. 1). In the game, the sender’s task 
was to inform the receiver about a particular feature of a visual stimulus 
(i.e., about its size, brightness or color). The sender, however, was not 
allowed to use speech or gesture to communicate, but was asked to pick 
particular stimuli in the auditory (or olfactory) modality as a commu-
nication medium. In particular, the sender could play piano tones of 
different auditory pitch for the receiver to hear or she could present 
different scents for the receiver to smell. Thus, for example, the sender 
could communicate to the receiver about the particular size of a visual 
stimulus by playing a tone of a particular height on the piano. The 
receiver, in turn, needed to match the height of the tone she heard to one 
of the differently sized visual stimuli she saw on a computer screen (see 
Fig. 1A). That is, the receiver needed to “translate” the auditory stimulus 
feature back into a visual stimulus feature. 
We designed three different versions of this game; each version was 
based on one specific crossmodal correspondence that has been estab-
lished in the literature. In particular, we relied on the correspondences 
between (1) audition [pitch] and vision [size] (Evans & Treisman, 2010; 
Gallace & Spence, 2006; Spence & Parise, 2012); (2) audition [pitch] 
and vision [brightness] (Klapetek et al., 2012; Marks, 1987; Martino & 
Marks, 1999; Melara, 1989); and (3) olfaction and vision [color] 
(Demattè, Sanabria, & Spence, 2006, 2009; Deroy, Crisinel, & Spence, 
2013; Gilbert, Martin, & Kemp, 1996; Kemp & Gilbert, 1997; Österbauer 
et al., 2005). We tested each version in a separate experiment. In all 
three experiments, the visual modality served as the “referent” for 
communication (i.e., what to communicate about) whereas the 
“communication medium” (i.e., what to communicate with) was either 
audition (Experiments 1 and 2) or olfaction (Experiment 3). 
The central aim of these experiments was to test whether co-actors 
would spontaneously rely on crossmodal correspondences to create 
communicative mappings to facilitate joint action. In particular, we 
predicted that senders would map stimuli features in the two different 
sensory modalities (e.g., auditory tones of different pitch and visual 
stimuli of different size) in line with the nonarbitrary crossmodal cor-
respondences documented in the literature. For example, we expected 
senders to match high-pitched sounds with small circles and low-pitched 
sounds with large circles – rather than the opposite (i.e., high-pitched to 
large and low-pitched to small) or any other possible combination (Hy-
pothesis 1a). Thus, we predicted that senders would rely on (their in-
dividual) crossmodal correspondences when creating communicative 
signals, i.e., that they would use these correspondences for a novel 
purpose, namely the purpose of communication. If receivers, for their 
part, also (implicitly) assumed that crossmodal correspondences would 
form the basis for the mappings created by senders, then they should be 
able to interpret the communicative signals accurately. This mutual 
understanding between senders and receivers would consequently lead 
to successful joint task performance (Hypothesis 1b). 
A further research question we addressed in our study was concerned 
with how co-actors, when faced with the challenge of establishing a 
communication system, would deal with ambiguity with regard to the 
means of communication. Specifically, we asked whether, when faced 
with two alternative crossmodal mapping options, co-actors would 
manage to align their expectations and choose the same mapping – and 
which mapping option they would choose. 
We predicted that co-actors, once they had established a communi-
cation system based on particular crossmodal mappings and thereby 
created a new communicative convention, would stick to their estab-
lished system even if a second option to communicate becomes available 
(Hypothesis 2a). In particular, faced with the two options, senders now 
needed to choose whether to rely on the mapping that had been jointly 
established during the preceding interaction in part one of the experi-
ment (‘History’) or to create a different communication system based on 
the newly available mapping option (‘Novelty’). For communication to 
succeed, receivers’ expectations needed to correspond to the senders’ 
choice; close alignment of their expectations should therefore lead to 
successful joint task performance (Hypothesis 2b). 
2. Methods 
We conducted our study at the Tate Modern art gallery in London, 
UK, within the context of the public engagement series “Tate Exchange” 
on April 29–30, 2017. The aim of Tate Exchange is to provide a “space 
for everyone to make, play, talk, and reflect and to discover new per-
spectives on life, through art”2 and it regularly offers workshops, talks 
and events for the general public – in cooperation with artists, pro-
fessionals, and scientists. The general idea was to promote scientific 
research and to facilitate the exchange between scientists and the public, 
allowing a wide audience to explore, interact and discover how sensory 
experiences shape our world. 
For the present research, this context had three main implications: 
First, it created an environment that prompted openness, curiosity, and 
exploratory behavior in our participants. All our participants were 
museum visitors who volunteered to take part in our research because of 
their own intrinsic motivation to experience something new. Second, 
most of our participants came together as families or couples, leading to 
a higher-than-usual proportion of participants who were familiar with 
each other. Third, conducting our research in a museum environment 
meant that our experiments had to be relatively short to remain inter-
esting and understandable without long instructions. We accommodated 
our methodology to reflect these constraints and opportunities. In the 
following, we report the methods used for all our three experiments and 
highlight the ways in which the individual experiments differed from 
each other. 
2.1. Participants 
Participants were visitors at Tate Modern who gave their informed 
consent for their anonymized data to be used for research purposes. Our 
experiment had been approved by the museum. We asked visitors to 
participate in pairs of two. Most people arrived jointly in pairs (7 of 12 
pairs in Experiment 1; 12 of 12 pairs in Experiment 2; 6 of 8 pairs in 
Experiment 3) and thus pair members knew each other beforehand; all 
other individuals were randomly matched with an unfamiliar partner. 
Demographic information can be found in Table 1. 
2.2. Stimuli 
2.2.1. Basic experimental setup 
The setup for our communication game is shown in Fig. 1. It con-
sisted of the following equipment. An ASUS laptop running Matlab 
(2015) was used to control the experimental procedure and record the 
data. The visual stimuli for senders were shown on the laptop’s screen 
(resolution: 1280 × 720 pixels) placed on a normal-sized table. To 
present the visual stimuli to receivers and record their responses, an LCD 
1 This is also in line with Grice’s idea that speakers are cooperative when they 
rely on the information they share with their addressee (Grice, 1975). Thus, 
conversations “are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative ef-
forts” (Grice, 1975, p. 26). 
2 https://www.tate.org.uk/visit/tate-modern/tate-exchange (retrieved on 
January 26, 2020) 
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touch screen (resolution: 1280 × 720 pixels) was used. It was placed on a 
high table at a height comfortable for adults to stand at and was located 
in a position that prevented receivers from seeing the senders’ screen 
(which was placed on the left behind receivers’ back), see Fig. 1. 
2.2.2. Communication medium 
Depending on the particular experiment, different technology trig-
gered and recorded senders’ “communicative signals”. In Experiments 1 
and 2, a portable digital piano (Yamaha Piaggero NP12) was used as the 
communication medium. Three keys on the piano (a low C2 with midi 
code 36, a middle C4 with midi code 60 and a high C6 with midi code 
84) were marked with bright yellow stickers to facilitate participants’ 
choice. The other keys on the piano remained functional. The data from 
the piano were exported in midi format, containing information about 
which key was pressed, when and how long it was pressed, and what 
force was used to press it. If senders pressed more than one piano key in a 
trial (which occurred only in 11% of all trials of all three experiments 
combined), we analyzed the key they pressed last because this was 
typically the one that receivers acknowledged and based their response 
upon. 
In Experiment 3, custom-made force plates (using an Arduino Mega 
2560 microcontroller) provided a binary signal indicating whether an 
object was placed on each plate or not. This signal was used to record, 
for each trial, which instance of the communication medium – in this 
case odor bottles – senders picked up and handed over to receivers who 
then smelled the scent. The odor stimuli were three teas with strong, 
distinct scents: black tea (with bergamot scent), fruit tea (with cherry 
scent) and mint tea (with mint scent). All teas had a similar dark color 
and were filled into small opaque glass bottles. An easy-to-open lid 
allowed participants to smell the different scents (Fig. 1C). 
2.2.3. Referent for communication 
The referents for communication were visual stimuli that varied 
along one particular dimension (size, brightness or color, depending on 
the experiment; see Table 2). In addition to the one-dimensional stim-
ulus features used in all experiments, participants in Experiments 1 and 
2 received a further ‘two-dimensional’ set of stimuli in a second part of 
the experiment. These two-dimensional stimuli (Table 2) varied along 
two perceptual feature dimensions, i.e., in both size and brightness. 
Importantly, the stimuli were designed such that the mappings for the 
two dimensions were not congruent, e.g., the large circle was white such 
that its size corresponded to a low-pitched tone (large > low pitch) yet 
its brightness corresponded to a high-pitched tone (bright > high pitch). 
Thus, depending on the chosen stimulus dimension (size or brightness), 
the resulting crossmodal mapping would differ, allowing us to deter-
mine whether participants used the same mapping as in the first, one- 
dimensional part of the experiment or whether they established a 
different mapping. 
2.3. Procedure 
The experimenter introduced the task (“you will be playing a 
communication game together”) and informed each person about their 
respective role (“one of you will be the sender who sends information to 
the other person; one of you will be the receiver whose job it is to un-
derstand the signals they receive”) and that their communication would 
have to be non-verbal (“importantly, you are not allowed to speak with 
each other or to use gestures – so you will have to invent a new, non- 
verbal language!”). 
Participants then performed two randomly chosen training trials to 
get familiarized with the task procedure (guided by the experimenter 
and by short written instructions on the computer screens), after which 
they performed 15 experimental trials (corresponding to the one- 
dimensional part). Each trial started with the presentation of the 
Fig. 1. Examples of our communication game where participant pairs communicated “crossmodally”. The ‘sender’ (sitting) relied on auditory pitch (by playing 
different piano tones) to communicate about visual stimuli of different size (A, Experiment 1) or of different brightness (B, Experiment 2); the ‘receiver’ (standing) 
needed to select the matching stimulus on the touch screen. (C) In Experiment 3, the sender relied on olfactory stimuli (by picking different scents of tea in opaque 
bottles) to inform the receiver (who could open the bottles to smell the scents) about visual stimuli of different colors that the receiver needed to select on the 
touch screen. 
Table 1 
Demographic information of participants across the three experiments.  
Experiment Senders Receivers 
Gender Age Gender Age 
1 Pitch & size 5 M, 7 F 32.8 (19–54) 4 M, 8 F 30.3 (20–57) 
2 Pitch & brightness 5 M, 7 F 30.5 (23–42) 6 M, 6 F 29.2 (23–42) 
3 Odor & color 2 M, 6 F 45.5 (26–64) 6 M, 2 F 40.4 (18–66)  
L. Schmitz et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Acta Psychologica 212 (2021) 103222
5
visual stimuli, i.e., three circles differing in size (Experiment 1), 
brightness (Experiment 2), or color (Experiment 3) appeared on the 
sender’s and receiver’s screens (identical images were shown on both 
screens). To avoid any implicit ordering of the stimuli on the screen (e. 
g., as could happen if presented in a row), stimuli were arranged in an 
isosceles triangle, where the respective position of the three stimuli 
randomly changed from trial to trial. After 2 s, two of the three circles on 
the sender’s screen vanished and only the target stimulus remained; the 
receiver’s screen remained unchanged. Senders were instructed to 
communicate the identity of this target stimulus to receivers by pressing 
a key on the keyboard (Experiments 1 and 2) or handing over one of the 
three odor bottles (Experiment 3). Based on this communicative signal, 
the receiver then chose a visual target on his / her screen by touching it. 
If the correct target was chosen, both sender and receiver got immediate 
positive feedback in the form of a green circle around the chosen target 
(or a happy smiley on the target in Experiment 3). If the incorrect target 
was chosen, the feedback was negative, indicated by a red circle (or an 
unhappy smiley in Experiment 3). The feedback stayed on the screen 
and, after 1 s, a “continue” button appeared on the receiver’s screen. The 
receiver was asked to touch this button once both participants were 
ready for the next trial. 
When participants in Experiments 1 and 2 had finished the first, one- 
dimensional part, the experimenter asked whether they would be willing 
to perform a second part of the game. All participants agreed. Partici-
pants were informed by the experimenter that the objects they now 
needed to communicate about looked slightly different than in the first 
part. Participants then continued with the two-dimensional part of the 
experiment, in the same sender-receiver role distribution. 
Once participants had finished the full experiment, they were asked 
to complete a short debriefing questionnaire. Besides giving basic de-
mographic information, they were asked to rate the confidence they had 
experienced during the game. Specifically, the participant in the role of 
the sender was asked “How confident were you that your task partner 
would correctly interpret your signals?” and the participant in the role of 
the receiver was asked “How confident were you that you correctly 
interpreted your task partner’s signals?”. Answers were given on a 5- 
point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”. 
Each experiment took about 10 min in total. 
2.4. Data analysis 
For all experiments, we report 1) the sender’s mapping score and 2) 
the dyad’s joint match accuracy. The first measure indicates whether 
senders based their communicative mappings on crossmodal corre-
spondences. The second measure indicates whether receivers matched 
the two stimuli dimensions in the same way senders did; hence, it 
effectively represents the pair’s joint coordination performance. Spe-
cifically, joint match accuracy was computed as the percentage of trials 
in which the receiver chose the correct target stimulus, i.e., all trials 
where receiver and sender relied on the same mapping. 
To calculate the sender’s mapping score, we extracted the sender’s 
responses from the piano or force sensor. The raw values of all partici-
pants and experiments are publicly available on https://doi.org/10 
.17605/OSF.IO/J9PTC. To compute an overall mapping score, we 
counted the trials in which senders created mappings in line with the 
crossmodal correspondences documented in the literature. We then 
calculated the proportion of these trials of the total number of trials. This 
procedure is exemplified in the following equation for the pitch & size 
mapping in Experiment 1: 
Mapping score=
(




In the numerator, the number of trials where the senders chose the 
predicted crossmodal mappings are summed up, i.e., all trials where 
they mapped low pitches to big targets, medium pitches to medium- 
sized targets, and high pitches to small targets. In the denominator, 
the total number of trials is summed up, i.e., all trials with big, medium- 
sized, and small targets (total N = 15). The mapping score is now 
computed by dividing the number of trials with predicted mappings by 
the total number of trials (and multiplying it by 100 to get a score in 
percentage). For example, the sender in the pair whose raw data is 
presented in Fig. 2A consistently matched big targets to low-pitched 
tones, medium-sized targets to medium-pitched tones and small targets to 
high-pitched tones in all 15 trials, leading to a mapping score precisely 
according to our predictions: ((5 + 5 + 5) / (5 + 5 + 5)) *100 = 100%. In 
contrast, if, for example, the sender had matched the big target to a low- 
pitched tone only 2 out of 5 times, this would result in a lower mapping 
score: ((2 + 5 + 5) / (5 + 5 + 5)) *100 = 80%. Generally, if senders 
matched all stimuli according to our predictions, the resulting mapping 
score would be 100%; if they never matched accordingly, the score 
would be 0; and if they randomly chose their mappings, the score would 
be around 33%. Thus, the mapping score reflects how much senders use 
the predicted mapping in comparison to any other mapping, irrespective 
of what this other mapping was, that is, whether it was a random choice 
or a mapping that is consistent but systematically different from our 
predicted crossmodal mapping.3 A sender could, for example, consis-
tently choose to match small stimuli to medium-high pitches, medium- 
sized stimuli to low pitches, and large stimuli to high pitches and 
would still only get a mapping score of 0% because the chosen mapping 
is not what we expected based on our hypothesis about crossmodal 
correspondences as common ground. 
To test our first research question, we used the data from the one- 
Table 2 
Visual stimulus properties along with the predicted crossmodal mappings (in 
italics). In the two-dimensional part of Experiments 1 and 2, two alternative 
predictions could be made, as participants could either stick to the same cross-
modal mappings as in the one-dimensional part (‘History’) or switch to a 
different mapping (‘Novelty’).  
Experiment Stimulus 1 Stimulus 2 Stimulus 3 
1 Pitch & size, one-dimensional 
Size (Ø in cm) Large (15.0) Medium (11.25) Small (7.5) 
Brightness 
(RGB) 
Bright (255, 255, 
255) 
Bright (255, 255, 
255) 
Bright (255, 255, 
255) 
Pitch Low Medium High  
1 Pitch & size, two-dimensional 
Size (Ø in cm) Large (15.0) Medium (11.25) Small (7.5) 
Brightness 
(RGB) 
Bright (255, 255, 
255) 
Dark (77, 77, 77) Medium (166, 166, 
166) 
Pitch (History) Low Medium High 
Pitch (Novelty) High Low Medium  
2 Pitch & brightness, one-dimensional 









Pitch Low Medium High  
2 Pitch & brightness, two-dimensional 
Size (Ø in cm) Medium (10.0) Small (5.0) Large (15.0) 
Brightness 
(RGB) 




Bright (230, 230, 
230) 
Pitch (History) Low Medium High 
Pitch (Novelty) Medium High Low  
3 Odor & color, one-dimensional 
Size (Ø in cm) Large (15.0) Large (15.0) Large (15.0) 
Color (RGB) Black (0,0,0) Green (18, 212, 
133) 
Pink (255, 0, 102) 
Odor Bergamot Mint Cherry  
3 In Figures 3 and 4, we present the proportion of trials where participants 
used crossmodal mappings (‘Crossmodal’) and the proportion of trials where 
they used any other, not predicted type of mappings (‘Other’). Together, these 
proportions add up to 100%. 
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dimensional part of all experiments and statistically compared senders’ 
mapping scores to a chance level of 33% using one-sample t-tests. If 
senders’ mapping scores were significantly above chance, this would 
indicate that they consistently mapped the sensory stimuli according to 
the predicted crossmodal correspondences (Hypothesis 1a). We also 
compared the dyads’ joint match accuracies to a chance level of 33% 
using one-sample t-tests. If the joint match accuracies were significantly 
above chance, this would indicate that senders and receivers relied on 
the same crossmodal mapping (Hypothesis 1b). 
To test our second research question, we used the data from the 
second, two-dimensional part of Experiments 1 and 2 and statistically 
compared two alternative mapping scores using paired-samples t-tests. 
The two scores reflected the two different crossmodal mapping options, 
namely the option that had already been available in the previous, one- 
dimensional part of the experiment (e.g., mapping high-pitched to small 
in Experiment 1; ‘History’) and the option that had become newly 
available in the two-dimensional part thanks to the added second 
stimulus dimension (e.g., mapping high-pitched to bright in Experiment 1; 
‘Novelty’). Thus, we tested which of the two alternative crossmodal 
mappings senders used more frequently (Hypothesis 2a). In addition, as 
in the one-dimensional part, we compared the dyads’ joint match ac-
curacies to a chance level of 33% to test whether senders and receivers 
relied on the same crossmodal mapping (Hypothesis 2b). 
Data analysis and statistical testing were performed using custom-
ized R scripts (R Core Team, 2020). 
3. Results 
3.1. Crossmodal common ground for communication 
To investigate Hypothesis 1a, we analyzed senders’ mapping scores 
in the one-dimensional part of all experiments (Fig. 3A) and compared 
them to a chance level of 33%. In Experiment 1 (Pitch & size), we found 
that the score of 88.3% was significantly higher than chance, t(11) =
9.165, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.65.4 Similarly, the mapping score of 
96.7% in Experiment 2 (Pitch & brightness) was significantly higher 
than chance, t(11) = 22.878, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 6.6. This was also the 
case in Experiment 3 (Odor & color), where we computed a mapping 
score of 93.3%, t(7) = 19.55, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 6.91. 
The analysis of the dyads’ joint match accuracy (Hypothesis 1b) 
indicated that participants’ joint performance was significantly better 
than chance in all experiments. In Experiment 1, the accuracy was 87%, t 
(11) = 14.264, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 4.12.; in Experiment 2, it was 89%, 
t(11) = 16.462, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 4.75; in Experiment 3, it was 90%, 
t(7) = 9.048, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 3.2. 
In the debriefing questionnaire, we asked participants to rate on a 
scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very much”) how confident they had felt 
Fig. 2. Exemplary communicative signals from two senders in (A) Experiment 1 (pitch & size) and (B) Experiment 2 (pitch & brightness). The piano tones played by 
these senders are shown as a function of the visual target stimuli they were communicating about. The yellow arrows indicate the marked piano keys and the 
corresponding midi IDs. The trial highlighted with a red circle shows a joint match error, where, apparently, the sender continued to use the established crossmodal 
mapping (pitch & size) in the two-dimensional part, whereas the receiver did not. However, the pair immediately recovered from this initial misalignment of ex-
pectations. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
4 We also performed a post-hoc analysis including only the five pairs in 
Experiment 1 where partners did not know each other. The mapping score was 
significantly different from chance, t(4) = 39.396, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 17.62, 
replicating our finding also for this small sub-group of unfamiliar partners. This 
suggests that the successful usage of crossmodal correspondences for commu-
nication does not depend on prior familiarity between interaction partners. 
Further experiments are needed to test the potential role of familiarity more 
systematically. 
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about their way of communicating. The reported confidence ratings 
were overall high. Aggregated over all three experiments, senders were 
highly confident (4.29 on average) that receivers would understand 
their signals. Receivers, in turn, were also highly confident (4.5 on 
average) that they correctly interpreted the senders’ signals. To check 
whether senders’ and receivers’ confidence was related to the dyads’ 
actual joint performance, we performed correlation analyses of confi-
dence and joint match accuracy. We found high correlation coefficients 
for both senders, r = 0.824, p < .001 (Fig. 3B), and receivers, r = 0.751, 
p < .001 (Fig. 3C). 
3.2. Common ground and ambiguity 
To investigate Hypothesis 2a, we analyzed senders’ mapping scores 
in the two-dimensional part of Experiments 1 and 2. As in the one- 
dimensional part, we first tested whether senders relied on crossmodal 
correspondences by comparing their mapping scores to a chance level of 
33%. In particular, we initially wanted to verify whether senders relied 
on any type of crossmodal mapping at all, and thus we used a mapping 
score that combined the two alternative crossmodal mapping options 
that were available in the two-dimensional part (‘History’ + ‘Novelty’). 
In Experiment 1, this combined mapping score of 92.2% was signifi-
cantly higher than chance, t(11) = 19.404, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 5.6. 
Also in Experiment 2, the combined mapping score of 97.2% was 
significantly above chance, t(11) = 23.12, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 6.67. 
To determine which of the two alternative crossmodal mappings 
senders prioritized, we then directly compared the two mapping scores 
as this comparison would indicate which mapping was used more 
frequently (Fig. 4). Senders’ mapping scores in Experiment 1 (Pitch & 
size) were significantly higher for the pitch-to-size mapping that they 
had also used in the previous, one-dimensional part (‘History’), 
compared to the pitch-to-brightness mapping that became available in 
the two-dimensional part (‘Novelty’), t(11) = 3.943, p < .01, Cohen’s d 
= 2.26. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2 (Pitch & brightness), 
where the interaction history (i.e., using a pitch-to-brightness mapping) 
dominated over the newly available pitch-to-size mapping, t(11) =
2.592, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 1.49. 
An analysis of the dyad’s joint match accuracy in the two- 
dimensional parts (Hypothesis 2b) showed that, for the most part, re-
ceivers matched the two stimuli dimensions in the same way senders 
did, leading to high accuracy. Joint match accuracy was significantly 
higher than chance in both Experiment 1 with an accuracy of 71%, t(11) 
= 5.214, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.51, and in Experiment 2 with an ac-
curacy of 83%, t(11) = 7.386, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.13. 
4. Discussion 
The proposal we put forward here is to consider ‘crossmodal common 
Fig. 3. (A) Senders’ mapping scores for the first one-dimensional part of all three experiments. The dashed lines represents a chance mapping score of 33%. Dark grey 
(Crossmodal) shows the percentage of trials in which senders used the predicted crossmodal mapping; white (Other) shows the percentage of trials where senders 
used any other type of mapping. (B) Senders’ and (C) receivers’ confidence ratings as a function of joint performance represented by joint match accuracy 
(aggregated data from all experiments). Dot size represents number of participants; the grey lines show linear regression lines, and the dashed lines represent ac-
curacy at chance level. 
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ground’ as a basis for communication and joint action. We regard this 
form of common ground as complementary to other previously dis-
cussed forms such as communal common ground, based on societal 
norms and conventions, or personal common ground, based on joint 
experience (Clark, 1996; Lewis, 1969; Stalnaker, 2002). What sets 
crossmodal common ground apart from these and other forms of com-
mon ground is that it is available to groups of people who have entirely 
different backgrounds (e.g., do not speak the same language) and who 
have not previously interacted. Instead, crossmodal common ground can 
facilitate interaction between multiple people simply because they share 
the same perceptual apparatus and therefore process multisensory in-
formation in comparable ways. In fact, more generally, there seems to be 
a basic, overarching common ground provided to all of us by virtue of 
our shared perceptual capacities: “All of us take as common ground, I 
assume, that people normally have the same senses, sense organs, and 
types of sensations.” (Clark, 1996, p. 106). Crossmodal common ground 
may be described as a special subset of our perceptual common ground 
because it is not based on shared “types of sensations” but rather on 
shared associations between those sensations. Crossmodal common 
ground is not present because we perceive a specific stimulus feature in 
the same way but because we make the same association between this 
stimulus feature and specific other features in different sensory modal-
ities – and because we are mutually aware that we do so. In other words, 
if we expect that all (or at least, most) people associate small objects with 
light colors and high-pitched sounds, we can assume this association as 
common ground and make corresponding predictions about others’ 
behavior which, in turn, facilitates joint action. 
4.1. Empirical evidence for crossmodal common ground 
As a proof of concept, we tested this general proposal in a set of three 
short experiments within the context of a public engagement event in an 
art museum. Pairs of museum visitors participated in a communication 
game, in which one person (the ‘sender’) informed their partner (the 
‘receiver’) about different visual stimuli. Instead of using conventional 
forms of communication such as speech or gesture, however, our task 
required participants to spontaneously create a communication system 
using one sensory modality as the referent (e.g., visual stimuli of 
different size to communicate about) and another as the communication 
medium (e.g., piano tones of different auditory pitch to communicate 
with). Thus, for example, the sender could communicate to the receiver 
about the particular size of a visual stimulus by playing a tone of a 
particular height on the piano. The receiver needed to match the height 
of the tone she heard to one of the differently sized visual stimuli she saw 
on a computer screen. 
The aim of a first ‘one-dimensional’ part of our communication game 
was to test whether co-actors would spontaneously rely on crossmodal 
correspondences to create communicative mappings. Crucially, in order 
for communication to succeed, this required, first, that senders created 
communicative signals based on crossmodal mappings, assuming that 
receivers would understand these, and second, that receivers interpreted 
the communicative signals accordingly. Confirming our hypotheses, we 
found overall high ‘mapping scores’ for senders (Hypothesis 1a) and 
high ‘joint match accuracies’ for the interacting dyads (Hypothesis 1b), 
indicating that both senders and receivers consistently matched visual 
stimuli with auditory (Experiments 1 and 2) or olfactory (Experiment 3) 
stimuli in line with crossmodal correspondences. 
The consistent use of crossmodal correspondences for communica-
tion we observed in all experiments was further confirmed by partici-
pants’ self-reports: When we asked senders after the experiment how 
confident they had felt that their communicative signals would be un-
derstood by their task partner, and receivers how confident they had felt 
that they interpreted the provided communicative signals correctly, 
most participants gave high ratings, which also correlated with how well 
they actually managed to coordinate (Fig. 3B and C). This indicates that, 
regardless of whether participants created or interpreted the commu-
nicative signals, they confidently relied on crossmodal correspondences 
and assumed that these would hold in the same way for their respective 
task partner. 
Notably, our results clearly show that participants did not first ac-
quire, or learn, crossmodal mappings. If these mappings had to be newly 
learned during the experiment, then most pairs should have started with 
several unsuccessful trials, before eventually converging on the same 
mapping. However, we find that most pairs are successful right from the 
start or improve very quickly. In addition, the fact that crossmodal 
mappings were consistently used by the majority of participants con-
firms that participants did not simply learn any new mapping. If this 
were the case, any other mapping system (not based on crossmodal 
Fig. 4. Two different mapping scores are shown for the two-dimensional part of Experiments 1 and 2: The mapping score for ‘History’ (dark grey) reflects how often 
senders used the same mapping as in the previous, one-dimensional part of the experiment; the mapping score for ‘Novelty’ (light grey) reflects how often senders 
created a mapping based on the newly introduced stimulus dimension. For completeness, ‘Other’ (white) is shown, representing all those alternative mapping 
combinations that do not reflect any predicted crossmodal correspondence. The dashed lines represent a chance mapping score of 33%. 
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correspondences) should have been as likely to be learned as the 
crossmodal mapping. However, we find a prevalence for the mapping 
that is based on crossmodal correspondences, indicating that ‘cross-
modal common ground’ was already there and participants did not just 
learn it while performing the experimental task. 
Still, despite these clear findings supporting our central hypothesis 
about crossmodal common ground, it is interesting to note that not all 
dyads were equally successful in playing the communication game. For 
example, one dyad experienced difficulties because the sender did not 
provide consistent communicative signals but unsystematically matched 
big targets with high-, medium-, and low-pitched tones. Consequently, the 
receiver, who depended on the sender’s communicative signals, made a 
couple of ‘match errors’, until the sender’s signals became more reliable. 
This failure can be attributed to a general problem underlying the rep-
resentation of others and their potentially differing perspective (e.g., 
Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). In particular, previous 
research has demonstrated the crucial need for consistency and align-
ment of representation in communication. For instance, in Galantucci’s 
seminal study in the field of experimental semiotics (Galantucci, 2005), 
participant dyads attempted to create novel communication systems 
from scratch; however, whereas most succeeded, participants in one 
dyad failed to converge on the same system even after more than two 
hours of interacting because the meaning of the signs created by the 
sender were ambiguous and not used consistently. This highlights that 
even if participants can learn through feedback, as in Galantucci’s study, 
joint convergence is not trivial. 
Such examples vividly demonstrate how senders’ and receivers’ ex-
pectations need to be aligned for communication to succeed. Impor-
tantly, senders need to be aware of the receivers’ background (that 
might differ from their own) and need to carefully monitor the receivers’ 
behavior in order to adjust their communicative signals if necessary, just 
as in conventional linguistic communication (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; 
Brennan, Kuhlen, & Charoy, 2018; Clark & Kruch, 2004; Lockridge & 
Brennan, 2002). In the present study, senders designed their commu-
nicative signals based on the (implicit) assumption that crossmodal 
correspondences would provide a background shared by receivers. This 
awareness about an interaction partner’s task, perspective, constraints 
etc. is not restricted to communicative interactions but a common 
feature of many joint actions (Curioni, Vesper, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 
2019; Schmitz, Vesper, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2017, 2018b; Sebanz et al., 
2006; Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2016; Vesper et al., 2010). 
4.2. Turning crossmodal into personal common ground 
In a second ‘two-dimensional’ part of our communication game, we 
followed up on the idea of partner-specific communication, or audience 
design. Our aim was to probe co-actors’ communicative preferences by 
exposing them to an ambiguous situation: In contrast to the first part, 
where the stimuli serving as referents for communication varied only in 
one stimulus dimension (e.g., only in size) and were thus ‘one-dimen-
sional’, the stimuli in the second part varied in two dimensions (e.g., in 
size and in brightness) – they were ‘two-dimensional’. This created a 
source of ambiguity for co-actors because senders now needed to decide 
whether to create crossmodal mappings based on the same stimulus 
dimension as in the first part, using the already established communi-
cation system (‘History’), or based on the newly introduced stimulus 
dimension (‘Novelty’). Our findings show that co-actors had a clear 
preference for relying on the established communication system, as 
indicated by senders’ overall high ‘mapping scores’ for the previously 
used crossmodal mapping (Hypothesis 2a) and by dyads’ high ‘joint 
match accuracies’ (Hypothesis 2b). This finding is interesting for at least 
two reasons: 
First, it demonstrates how crossmodal common ground – a form of 
common ground that does, importantly, not require personal acquain-
tance – can turn into personal common ground through repeated use 
within a joint action, or an interactive grounding process (cf. Clark & 
Brennan, 1991). In other words, something that began with a general 
expectation about the similarities in multisensory processing in other 
people quickly became a part of the particular interaction history of a 
particular sender-receiver-dyad. Future research needs to explore this 
finding further by systematically manipulating the type and amount of 
shared knowledge between different interaction partners to distinguish 
senders’ own preferences from their assumptions about their particular 
partners’ expectations. Moreover, a careful control of how familiar 
participants are with each other is desirable as in the present study, we 
could not entirely exclude the possibility that participants might rely on 
personal common ground that they had established before taking part in 
our research. However, it is rather unlikely that prior familiarity affected 
the present results, in particular, as a post-hoc analysis of our data 
demonstrated that also the pairs consisting of unfamiliar individuals 
consistently relied on crossmodal correspondences. 
Second, the finding points to a system in human communication that 
helps resolve ambiguous situations. It thereby complements our earlier 
work that showed a similarly high consistency in co-actors’ implicit 
preference for a particular way of communicating. Participant dyads in 
that study, when faced with two different options for communication – a 
sensorimotor communication strategy, in which their instrumental goal 
was combined with the communicative goal, and a communicative 
strategy, in which they could separate their instrumental and commu-
nicative action goals – quickly showed agreement as to which option to 
use (Vesper et al., 2017). Thus, in many cases of joint action, co-actors 
not only seem to have similar expectations about how to approach 
their coordination problem, but also which approach to give precedence 
in cases of ambiguity. 
Moreover, our present finding that co-actors prefer to rely on their 
joint interaction history is in line with Clark’s “Principle of joint 
salience”. This principle states that when faced with a coordination 
problem, people should ideally strive for the solution that is most salient 
with respect to their current common ground, i.e., for what is jointly 
most salient for them (Clark, 1996). By doing so, they reduce the 
chances of miscoordination. Further theoretical support for our finding 
comes from another of Clark’s principles, namely the “Principle of least 
collaborative effort” (Clark & Brennan, 1991; also cf. Grice, 1975). It 
says that people in a conversation try to minimize their collaborative 
effort, i.e., the combined effort of both speaker and addressee. When 
applying this principle to the ambiguous situation in our study, one 
should predict that dyads will continue to use the communication sys-
tem they had already established rather than creating a different system. 
The former clearly creates the least collaborative effort. Participants in 
our study acted accordingly by choosing to continue with their estab-
lished way of communicating. 
4.3. Theoretical backdrop and future directions 
With regard to the theoretical foundations of the present study, it is 
worth returning to the general concept of communication upon which 
our proposal about crossmodal common ground is based. We rely on the 
understanding that communicative behavior can be characterized as 
involving communicative intentions (cf. Scott-Phillips et al., 2009). 
Following Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) influential account of (osten-
sive) communication, which is built around the expression and recog-
nition of intentions, we can distinguish informative intentions (i.e., the 
intention to convey information to one’s addressee) and communicative 
intentions (i.e., the intention to make one’s informative intention known 
to one’s addressee). In our experiments, the roles of ‘sender’ and 
‘receiver’ were pre-defined and the two participants were explicitly 
instructed to communicate. Thus, they were mutually aware that the 
sender had an informative intention and that this intention was known 
by the receiver, i.e., the sender’s intent to communicate was already 
explicit. Hence, the sender did not have to demonstrate ostensively to 
the receiver that she was trying to communicate; the receiver, in turn, 
did not have to recognize the sender’s behavior as communicative (cf. 
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Scott-Phillips et al., 2009). 
Our experiments show that by using crossmodal correspondences 
consistently and repeatedly for communication, participants created a 
communicative convention. According to many researchers in the field 
(e.g., Galantucci, 2009; Misyak, Noguchi, & Chater, 2016; Tamariz, 
Roberts, Martínez, & Santiago, 2018), the emergence of conventions is 
one of the characteristics of communication systems; languages might 
even be referred to as a set of “conventional codes” (Scott-Phillips, 
2015). In our study, participants established – over time and via the 
repeated usage of crossmodal mappings for a communicative purpose – 
a new conventional code between them. Whereas crossmodal corre-
spondences as such pre-existed, the use of crossmodal correspondences 
as communicative mappings did not and thus newly emerged into a 
communicative convention. This goes beyond previous research which 
has shown that individuals make stable associations between stimulus 
features in different sensory modalities by showing that individuals also 
expect others to share these associations. Notably, the results of the 
second part of Experiments 1 and 2 also indicate that participants stick 
to the convention they created in the first part of the experiment, rather 
than introducing a different set of mappings. 
Given the apparent prevalence of crossmodal common ground in 
adults, an interesting direction for future research is to investigate its 
developmental trajectory. Although the current study was not designed 
to investigate this question, we actually acquired anecdotal evidence5 
from eight pairs of children aged between 7 and 15 who played the 
communication game in the version of Experiment 2. Their data allow us 
to draw two very careful conclusions at this point: On the one hand, the 
data from the first ‘one-dimensional’ part suggest that children in that 
age range do equally well as adults in using crossmodal correspondences 
for the purpose of communicating with each other. On the other hand, 
the data from the second ‘two-dimensional’ part indicate that children 
might differ in interesting ways from adults when facing ambiguity in 
communication. Specifically, it seemed that the children who partici-
pated in our study did not show the same clear preference for relying on 
interaction history as adults did. In fact, children chose the ‘Novelty’ 
mapping, rather than the ‘History’ mapping, for a good portion of trials, 
only matching around 60% of the trials based on ‘History’ – in contrast 
to the adults’ 80% in Experiments 1 and 2. There are, of course, many 
aspects to consider here, such as children’s natural playfulness and cu-
riosity which might have biased them to try something new instead of 
going for the “safe” option; still, these data point to interesting questions 
to be explored further. 
4.4. Conclusion 
In the present work, we propose that people share a specific form of 
common ground because they process multisensory information in 
comparable ways; in particular, because they experience the same 
crossmodal correspondences between stimuli features from different sen-
sory modalities. We further propose that people can employ this cross-
modal common ground for communication and joint action. We thereby 
extend previous research, which has shown that individuals consistently 
exhibit crossmodal correspondences, by predicting that individuals also 
expect others to share and understand these correspondences. Initial 
support for our proposal comes from a series of short experiments where 
joint action partners – unable to use conventional forms of communi-
cation such as speech or gesture – systematically mapped visual stimulus 
features with, for example, auditory stimulus features in line with 
crossmodal correspondences to create communicative signals. With this 
proof-of-concept study, we thus contribute to the current issues in joint 
action research, specifically to the research on how communication 
systems emerge in the face of interpersonal coordination demands. We 
conclude that crossmodal correspondences not only occur within in-
dividuals but that they can also be actively used to facilitate the coor-
dination between individuals. 
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